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Abstract: 
In this paper, we investigate the causal relationship between defence spending and 
economic growth in Portugal during the period of 1980-2010. We apply the ARDL bounds 
testing approach in the presence of structural break. These methods are robust to the 
violation of statistical assumptions especially when the sample size is small. The ARDL-
ECM estimation results disclose that the relations between defense spending, capital, labor 
and economic growth are country specifics. The interesting finding of this study is that 
there is a U-shaped relation exists between defense spending and economic growth. In 
addition, the unidirectional causality from defense spending to economic growth exists in 
case of Portugal. Therefore, defence spending can play an important role in economic 
development of Portugal. 
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Introduction 
With the advent of globalization, the discussion over the link between defence spending 
and economic growth has been widespread. The direction between these variables has 
been an emerging area of investigation in recent decades. While a positive interaction 
between defence spending and economic growth is usually expected, findings in the 
existing literature do not necessarily confirm to this stereotyped direction. Two views of 
the existing literature explained that defence spending affects economic growth through 
the domestic production. According to the Keynesian framework, military spending raises 
the aggregate demand by generating output and creating employment opportunities in the 
country (Gold, 1990; Chan, 1995). In addition, it has a spill-over effect on human capital 
applying the expenditures on education, research and technological enhancements (see 
Barro, 1991; Adam and Gold, 1987). Furthermore, it also promotes the investment climate 
and promoting the international business opportunities in the economy (Heo, 2010). In 
contrast, however, the neoclassical model explained military spending has crowding-out 
effect on both public and private investment that will negatively influence economic 
growth (Sandler and Hartley, 1995). In general public sector are less concerned about the 
cost of production rather than the private sector. Therefore, the concept of technical 
efficiency are absent in the public sector. 
 
Based on the earlier literature debate on defence spending and economic growth nexus, the 
examining the relationship between these variables on a country-by-country basis becomes 
important. Despite enormous amounts of literature on defence spending and economic 
growth, we will mainly focus on these studies because defence spending and economic 
growth can be different due to different countries' characteristics such as different public 
and private investment, structure of investment, political and economic histories, cultures, 
social security system and different institutional arrangements. A series of studies found 
that military spending neglected/reducing the economic growth [Smith, (1977); Boretsky, 
(1975); Sivard, (1977); Atesoglu (2002), Ocal and Brauer (2007) and Smith and Tuttle 
(2008)]. However, the opposite evidence also exists in the earlier literature that military 
spending promotes economic growth [Benoit (1973, 1978); Halicioglu (2003, 2004); 
Wijeweera and Webb (2009); Atesoglu, (2009) and, Wijewerra and Webb (2011)]. 
Therefore the relationship between defence spending and economic growth is still 
inconclusive in the literature. 
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An upward movement in economic growth and defence spending has raised some 
questions in Portugal’s perspective such as: (1) Is there any long-term relationship between 
these variables? (2) What are the short-run relationships between these variables? (3) What 
are the directions of the causality? (4) What are the policy implications of the findings? 
Our study attempts to answer these questions in the context of Portugal. We also consider 
the influence of capital and labour within the growth-defence nexus. We apply newly 
developed methods based on simulations that are robust with respect to the violation of 
statistical assumptions, especially when the sample size is small in the case in this paper. 
The empirical analysis of this study employs the ARDL bounds testing approach (Pesaran, 
1997; Pesaran and Shin, 1999; and Pesaran et al, 2001). This approach has a number of 
advantages compared to other cointegration techniques such as that of Johansen and 
Juselius (Engle and Granger, 1987; Johansen, 1988; Johansen and Juselius, 1990; 
Johansen, 1995). Firstly, it allows for smaller sample sizes. Secondly, It can be used 
regardless of whether the variables are purely I(0), purely I(1), or mutually cointegrated.  
Thirdly, it provides unbiased long-run estimates and valid t-statistics. Fourthly, this 
approach provides a method of assessing the short-run and long-run. Finally, the critical 
value bounds are computed by stochastic simulations. 
 
The contribution of this approach is that it takes into account a number of potential 
advantages compare to the earlier literature. In addition, the empirical analysis of this 
study employs the ARDL bounds testing approach (Pesaran, 1997; Pesaran and Shin, 
1999; and Pesaran et al, 2001) applying the supply side model (Mintz and Huang, 1990, 
1991). This approach has a number of advantages compared to other cointegration 
techniques such as that of Johansen and Juselius (Engle and Granger, 1987; Johansen, 
1988; Johansen and Juselius, 1990; Johansen, 1995). It allows for smaller sample sizes.  
Second, It can be used regardless of whether the variables are purely I(0), purely I(1), or 
mutually cointegrated. Third, the unit root properties are examined by applying structural 
break unit root test such as Zivot-Andrews, (1992). Fourth, it provides unbiased long-run 
estimates and valid t-statistics. Fifth, this approach provides a method of assessing the 
short-run and long-run. Finally, the critical value bounds are computed by stochastic 
simulations. 
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section-2 explains military spending 
in Portugal. Section-3 outlines a review of the literature on output-defence nexus. Section-
4 we outline the econometric specification and estimation methodology and discuss how 
various hypotheses are tested, while section-5 provides a discussion of our empirical 
results. Finally, Section-6 discusses major findings and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Portuguese Context 
Portugal is one of the first countries that joined the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in 
Washington, D.C. on 4 April 1949, beside the Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
France, United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Italy, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland. 
Based on the national laws, Portugal military mission is to protect the territorial integrity 
of the country and providing humanitarian assistance and security at home and abroad 
(CIA World Factbook, 2012). An important moment in Portugal’s military history was the 
left-wing military coup in Lisbon, made by Portuguese military officers, in 1974, toppled 
the Caetano government. The main objective of this action was obtaining a radical change 
in government attitudes. Moreover, since 1975, this general military context has new 
changes: Portugal participation in peacekeeping missions in East Timor, Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq (Nasiriyah), and Lebanon. In addition, the elimination of 
compulsory military service since 2000s has accelerated the growing trend of military 
spending (Dunne and Nikolaidou, 2005).   
 
The Portuguese armed forces have been claimed in the international arena with regard to 
international security. There are many examples of Portuguese military missions. Portugal 
is a full member of the Atlantic Alliance, European Union, United Nations, and Portuguese 
speaking countries (PALOP). According to the data collected from the Ministry of 
Defence, in 1995 the mission that took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina (IFOR) had a 
contingent of nine hundred soldiers. To add to this sum, in 1999, Portugal secured a very 
significant presence in the Balkans and East Timor. In terms of humanitarian missions 
should be noted the presence in Kosovo and East Timor (INTERFET). In 2001, through 
the United Nations, Portuguese military forces were in Ukraine. The Portuguese military 
intervention was still in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon. The prestige and recognition of 
Portuguese military forces has increased considerably in recent years. The participation in 
international missions by the Portuguese armed forces strengthened the bonds of Portugal 
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with the European Union, the North Atlantic Alliance, and was decisive in the case of 
Timor East, reinforcing Portugal's position in the United Nations. 
 
Thus, the amount of military spending had a positive trend in the period of 2005-2009, 
based on the rise of GDP’s rates, even if the military spending as percent of GDP 
degreased. If the military spending increased from US$ 403.919 billions, in 2005, at US$ 
459.405 billions, in 2009, the military spending as percentage of GDP decreased from 
2.11%, in 2005, at 1.97%, in 2009. In this analyzed period, the maximum level of military 
spending as percent of GDP was 2.11%, registered in the year 2005, and the minimum 
level was 1.89%, obtained in 2007. In the rest of the years, the military spending as percent 
in GDP was 2.02% in 2006, and 1.91% in 2008. In this case, the military spending as 
percent of GDP, in 2005-2008 periods, show a U-shape curve, but the real amount of 
military spending increases permanent.  
 
In this context, the total real amount of military spending increased in tandem with the 
GDP growth’s rates. According to Nikolaidou (2008), the reduction of Portuguese military 
burden after 1974 is attributed to the end of the dictatorship but most importantly to the 
end of the Colonial Empire. More, the author stresses that the domestic defence industry 
was supplying arms and munitions to the army, but Portuguese defence industry is small, 
inefficient, and underdeveloped. 
 
3. Review of the Literature 
Despite enormous amounts of literature on defence spending and economic growth, we 
will mainly divided the results from earlier studies on the defence-growth nexus into two 
broad categories: 1) positive link between defence spending and economic growth, 2) 
negative link between defence spending and economic growth. Since the pioneering work 
of Benoit (1973, 1978) found that positive linkage between military spending and 
economic growth through positive spill-over effects. The validity of relationship also 
exists in the other studies [Kennedy (1974); Deger, (1986); Kollias, (1995); Sezgin, (1997, 
1999)]. Theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that defence expenditures influencing 
the aggregate demand by stimulating output and creating employment opportunities in the 
country (MacNair et al. 1995).  The positive nexus is also true for Turkey and Greece 
(Sezgin, 2001). Yildirm et al. (2005) found a positive interaction between military 
spending and economic growth for OECD countries applying dynamic panel data 
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approach. The similar result also found in case for Fiji includes exports in production 
function Narayan and Singh, (2007). Recently, Using the VAR approach, positive linkage 
is also evident for Sri Lanka (Wijeweera and Webb, 2009); for US (Atesoglu, 2009); South 
Asia (Gupta et al. 2010); for India (Tiwari and Shahbaz, 2012). 
 
The second line of research provides empirical evidence about the negative impact of 
military spending on economic growth [Deger and Smith, (1983); Fredericksen and 
Looney, (1982); Faini et al. (1984) and, Birdi and Dunne, (2002)]. The result is found for 
both time series and cross section analysis. The similar result is true for African 
economies, Lim (1983); South Korea, Heo (1999); Egypt, Israel and Syria, Abu-Bader and 
Abu-Qarm (2003); for Peru's economy, Klein (2004); for Turkey Karagol (2006); for 
Malaysia Tang (2008); for South Asia Robert and Alexander (2012); and for Pakistan 
Shahbaz and Shabbir (2012), Shahbaz et al. (2012) and for India Tiwari and Shahbaz 
(2012). 
 
The third line of earlier from earlier studies on causality the fall into three broad 
categories: 1) bidirectional causality 2) unidirectional causality from defence spending to 
economic growth, and finally 3) unidirectional causality from economic growth to defence 
spending. The findings of bidirectional causality between defence pending and economic 
growth appear in the emerging economics such as Pakistan, Tahir (1995); Pakistan and 
India, Khilji and Mahmood (1997); South Africa, Dunne and Vougas (1999); and 
European Union, Kollias et al. (2007). Unidirectional causation from economic growth to 
defence spending is found in the Turkey, Karagol and Palaz (2004). The reverse is true for 
the case of Portuguese economy, Dunne and Nikolaidou (2005).  
 
4. Theoretical Background and Estimation Strategy 
There are two types of models investigating relationship between defence spending and 
economic growth: demand-side and supply-side models. Demand-side models provide the 
indirect impact of defence spending on economic growth dealing with numerous 
dependent variables such as savings, investment, education, or public health expenditures 
without the theoretical framework for empirical analysis. Although, Deger, (1986); Deger 
and Smith, (1983); Rasler and Thompson, (1988) and Mintz, (1989) applied many 
empirical models to investigate the relationship between defense spending and economic 
growth but provided inconsistent and biased results.  
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Supply-side models derived from a production function directly scrutinize the impact of 
defense spending on economic growth. Supply-side models provide traditional theoretical 
structure to investigate the relationship between defence spending and economic growth 
using aggregate production function (Heo, 2000). Existing studies in defense economics 
provide inconsistent findings regarding defense-growth nexus using supply-side models 
due to sample bias (Huang and Mintz, 1991; Mueller and Atesoglu, 1993; Ward and 
Davis, 1992; Ward et al. 1995).  
 
We employ Mintz and Huang, (1990, 1991) to examine the impact of defense spending on 
economic growth using the data of Portuguese economy over the period of 1980-2009 
without non-defense government expenditure due to non-availability of data. The general 
functional form of model is given below: 
 
),,,( ttttt LKTRDfY       (1) 
 
Where tY  is real GDP per capita for economic growth, D  denotes real defense spending 
per capita, tTR  shows real trade per capita ((real exports + real imports) / population)), tK  
for real capital per capita and tL for labour force per capita. The linear specification of 
model has been converted into log-linear specification, since log-linear specification 
provides more appropriate and efficient results as compared to simple linear functional 
form of model (see for details Feridun and Shahbaz, 2010).  
 
tttttt LKTRDY   lnlnlnlnln 11111   (2) 
 
Where tYln indicates natural log of real GDP per capita, tDln   shows natural log of 
defense spending per capita, natural log of trade per capita is indicated by tTRln , natural 
log of real capital use per capita is shown by tKln  and tLln specifies labour force per 
capita.  is residual term assumed to be normally distributed with constant variance and 
zero mean. 
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Prior to testing for cointegration, it is standard to check for stationarity properties of the 
series. The study period witnessed some major upheavals in the global stage which can 
cause structural breaks in the macroeconomic dynamics. The ARDL bounds test works 
regardless of whether or not the regressors are I(1) or I(0) / I(1), the presence of I(2) or 
higher order renders the F-test unreliable (See Ouattra, 2004). We check the stationarity 
properties using Ng-Perron (2001) with intercept and trend keeping in mind that it is not 
appropriate in the presence of structural break in the series. So, we apply the Zivot-
Andrews (ZA) (1992) and Clemente et al. (1998) unit root tests which take care of 
structural break. The former identifies one structural break; and latter two structural breaks 
in the series. The Clemente et al. (1998) test has more power as compared to the ZA 
(1992) test.  
 
We choose the ARDL bounds testing approach for its advantages. First, it is flexible and 
applies regardless the order of integration, as noted. The simulation shows that this 
approach is superior and provides consistent results for small sample (Pesaran and Shin, 
1999). Moreover, a dynamic unrestricted error correction model (UECM) can be derived 
from the ARDL bounds testing through a simple linear transformation. The UECM 
integrates the short run dynamics with the long run equilibrium without losing any long 
run information. For estimation purposes, following the ARDL model to be used:  
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where DUM is dummy for structural break and t is residual term having normal 
distribution. Test of cointegration involves comparing the computed F-statistic with the 
critical bounds generated by Pesaran et al. (2001) i.e. upper critical bound (UCB) and 
lower critical bound (LCB). The null hypothesis 0:0  LKTRDYH   of no 
cointegration is tested against the alternate 0:  LKTRDYaH   of 
cointegration1. The series are cointegrated if the computed F-statistic exceeds the UCB and 
not cointegrated if the computed F-statistic lies below the LCB. If computed F-statistic 
falls between the UCB and LCB, the test is uncertain. We use the critical bounds from 
Narayan (2005), which are more appropriate for small sample, 31 in this case, compared to 
Pesaran et al. (2001). The parameter stability is checked by applying the CUSUM and 
CUSUMSQ tests proposed by Brown et al. (1975).  
 
For the long run relation among the series we use the following equation: 
 
   ittttt LKTRDY   lnlnlnlnln 43210  (8)  
                              
where, 1413121110 /,/,/,/,/  LKTRDY   and t  is 
the error term assumed to be normally distributed. Once the long run relationship is 
                                                 
1 Pesaran et al. (2001) have computed two asymptotic critical values - one when the variables are assumed to 
be I(0) and the other when the variables are assumed to be I(1). 
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established among the series, we test the direction of causality using the following error 
correction representation2: 
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where, (1 )L  is the lag operator and ECTt-1 is the lagged residual obtained from the long 
run ARDL relationship; ,,,, 4321 tttt  and t5  are error terms assumed to be N( ,0 ,).  
Long run causality requires a significant t-statistic on the coefficient of 1tECT . A 
significant F-statistic on the first differences of the variables suggests short run causality. 
Additionally, joint long-and-short runs causal relationship can be estimated by the joint 
significance of both 1tECT  and the estimate of lagged independent variables. For instance, 
iiB  0,12  shows that defense spending Granger-causes economic growth while causality 
runs from economic growth to defense spending is indicated by iiB  0,21 .  
 
The data on real GDP, defense spending, trade, capital and labour has been obtained from 
world development indicators (CD-ROM, 2011). We have population data to convert 
series into per capita and to normalise the data. The study covers the time period of 1980-
20103.   
 
5. Results and Discussions 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix is presented in Table-1. According to the 
Jarque-Bera normality test, the results indicated that all the series are normally distributed 
with zero mean and constant variance. There is a positive correlation between defense 
spending and economic growth and same inference is drawn for economic growth and 
capital. Labour and economic growth are correlated positively and same conclusion can be 
drawn between trade openness and economic growth. A positive correlation exists between 
defence spending and capital (labour and trade openness). Labor and trade openness are 
                                                 
2 If cointegration is not detected, the causality test is performed without an error correction term (ECT). 
3 Unavailability of defence spending data restricted us to choose this period for analysis  
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correlated with capital positively. Similarly, labour and trade openness are positively 
related.   
 
Traditional unit root tests are not reliable in the presence of structural break. It is pointed 
by Baum, (2004) that empirical evidence on order of integration of the variable by ADF, 
P-P and DF-GLS unit root tests is not reliable. To overcome this issue, we have used Ng-
Perron by Ng-Perron, (2001) to test the stationarity properties of defense spending, 
economic growth, trade openness, capital and labour. 
 
  Table-1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrices 
Variables  tYln  tDln  tKln  tLln  tTRln  
 Mean  9.2301  5.4047  7.7569  4.1933  8.7638 
 Median  9.2567  5.4425  7.7578  4.2051  8.7732 
 Maximum  9.4684  5.5789  8.1449  4.2142  9.1802 
 Minimum  8.8559  5.1493  7.1463  4.1422  8.3028 
 Std. Dev.  0.2189  0.1314  0.2974  0.0230  0.2655 
 Skewness -0.5410 -0.8583 -0.4965 -0.9640 -0.2992 
 Kurtosis  1.8453  2.3711  2.1722  2.4977  1.9319 
 Jarque-Bera  3.1301  4.1781  2.0895  4.9619  1.8736 
 Probability  0.2090  0.1237  0.3517  0.0836  0.3918 
tYln   1.0000     
tDln   0.5394  1.0000    
tKln   0.8372  0.3248  1.0000   
tLln   0.3670  0.1380  0.3000  1.0000  
tTRln   0.5287  0.1041  0.5519  0.2620  1.0000 
 
The results are pasted in Table-2. Empirical evidence indicates that the series are non-
stationary at level and found to be stationary at 1st difference. This implies that the series 
are I(1).  
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Table-2: Unit Root Analysis 
Ng-Perron at Level with Intercept and Trend 
Variables MZa MZt MSB MPT 
tYln  -4.8488 -1.3149 0.2711 17.4580 
tDln  -4.4447 -1.4507 0.3264 20.1586 
tTRln  -14.0699 -2.3071 0.1639 8.3407 
tKln  -13.0578 -2.3728 0.1817 7.9640 
tLln  -0.8565 -0.3567 0.4164 41.5504 
Ng-Perron at 1st Difference with Intercept and Trend 
tYln  -36.5077* -4.2700 0.1169 2.5090 
tDln  -26.0801* -3.5914 0.1377 3.6083 
tTRln  -26.8186* -3.5985 0.1341 3.7655 
tKln  -19.4185** -3.0642 0.1578 5.0030 
tLln  -19.4494** -3.0940 0.1590 4.8326 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
                                    
The results of Ng-Perron (2001) unit root test may be biased and inappropriate in the 
presence of structural break in the series. This deficiency of Ng-Perron, (2001) test has 
been covered by applying Zivot-Andrews, (1992) and Clemente et al. (1998) structural 
break unit root tests. Former contains information about one structural break and the latter 
has information about two structural breaks stemming in the series. The results for Zivot 
and Andrew, (1992) unit root test are presented in Table-3. These results suggest that we 
cannot reject the null of unit root for these variables in level but at 1st difference, it is 
possible to reject null hypothesis of unit root for all the variables. 
 
Table-3: Zivot-Andrews Unit Root Test 
Variable At Level At 1st Difference 
 T-statistic Time Break  T-statistic Time Break 
tYln  -5.023 (1) 1998 -5.842(1)* 1990 
tDln  -3.593 (0) 1993 -5.234(0)** 1990 
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tTRln  -3.835 (1) 2000 -5.229 (0)** 2006 
tKln  -4.237 (2) 2002 -5.447 (1)** 1989 
tLln  -2.374 (2) 1991 -5.933 (2)* 2003 
Note: *, ** represents significance at 1%, 5% levels. Lag order is shown in parenthesis.  
 
Table-4: Clemente-Montanes-Reyes Unit Root Test 
Variable Innovative Outliers Additive Outlier 
t-statistic TB1 TB2 t-statistic TB1 TB2 
tYln  -4.809 (6) 1984 1993 -5.887 (3)* 1983 1990 
tDln  -4.708 (3) 1986 1999 -5.467 (6)*** 1985 1990 
tTRln  -4.743 (6) 1985 1996 -6.052 (6)* 1985 1990 
tKln  -3.688 (6) 1984 1993 -6.233 (3)* 1983 2000 
tLln  -2.858 (4) 1986 1988 -5.801 (2)** 1991 2007 
Note: *, ** and *** indicates significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance. TB1 
and TB2 show structural break point 1 and 2. Lag order is shown in small parenthesis.  
 
To test the robustness of stationarity properties of the variables, Clemente et al. (1998) unit 
root test is also applied, which provides more consistent and reliable results as compared 
to Zivot-Andrews, (1992) unit root test. The main advantage of Clemente-Montanes-Reyes 
(1998) unit root test is that it has information about two unknown structural breaks in the 
series by offering two models i.e. an additive outliers (AO) model informs about a sudden 
change in the mean of a series and an innovation outliers (IO) model indicates about the 
gradual shift in the mean of the series. The additive outlier model is more suitable for the 
variables having sudden structural changes as compared to gradual shifts. 
 
Table-4 reports the results of Clemente et al. (1998) unit root test. The results reveal that 
all the variables have unit root at level but to found to be stationary at 1st difference in the 
presence of various structural breaks. Unit root tests show that none of the variable is 
integrated at (2) or beyond that order of integration. The computation of the ARDL F-
statistic for cointegration in the presence of structural break stemming in the series 
becomes unacceptable if any series is integrated at I(2) (Ouattara, 2004). The assumption 
of the ARDL bounds testing to cointegration is that integrating order of the variables 
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should be I(1), or I(0) or I(1)/ I(0). Our results reveal that all the series are integrated at 
I(1). Because of the same integrating order of the variables, the ARDL bounds testing 
approach to cointegration must be applied to test whether cointegration exists or not 
among the series such as economic growth ( )ln tY , defence spending ( )ln tD , trade 
openness ( )ln tTR , capital ( )ln tK and labour ( )ln tL . 
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  Table-5: ARDL Bounds Testing Analysis 
Bounds Testing to Cointegration Diagnostic tests 
Estimated Models  Optimal lag length F-statistics  Structural Break 2NORMAL  2ARCH  2RESET  
),,,/( LKTRDYFY  2, 2, 1, 2, 2 4.016 1998 2.8169 [1]: 0.0104 [1]: 3.2118
),,,/( LKTRYDFD  2, 2, 2, 2, 2 8.531* 1993 0.5809 [3]: 2.3310 [1]: 0.4137
),,,/( LKDYTRFTR  2, 2, 2, 2, 2 7.082** 2000 1.4908 [1]: 0.2404 [2]: 2.2076
),,,/( LTRDYKFK  2, 2, 2, 2, 2 5.624** 2002 0.5371 [4]: 1.8349 [1]: 0.0074
),,,/( KTRDYLFL  2, 2, 2, 2, 1 12.320* 1991 0.9944 [1]: 2.5344 [1]: 0.0109
Significant level 
Critical values (T= 31)      
Lower bounds I(0) Upper bounds I(1)     
1 per cent level 6.428 7.505     
5 per cent level 4.535 5.415     
10 per cent level 3.770 4.535     
Note: The asterisks * and ** denote the significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. The optimal lag length is
determined by AIC. [ ] is the order of diagnostic tests. # Critical values are collected from Narayan (2005). 
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Before proceeding to the ARDL bounds testing, appropriate lag length of the variables 
should be selected by using AIC and SBC criterions. It is pointed out by Lütkepohl, (2006) 
that AIC lag length criteria provide efficient and consistent results to capture the dynamic 
relation between the variables. So, using AIC criteria, optimal lag length of the variables is 
reported in 2 column of Table-5 with the results of the cointegration test. 
 
To take decision whether cointegration between the variables exists or not, we have to 
compare our calculated F-statistic following null hypothesis i.e. no cointegration with 
critical bounds such as LCB (lower critical bound) and UCB (upper critical bound). The 
results reveal that there are four cointegrating vectors. This represents the cointegration 
relationship between the variables at 1 and 5 percent significance level once defence 
spending, capital, labour and trade openness are treated as dependent variables in the 
presence of structural break stemming in the series4. The results reported in Table-3 show 
that the long run relationship between economic growth, defence spending, trade openness, 
capital and labour exists over the study period in the case of Portugal. 
 
The existence of the long run relationship among the variables helps us to find out partial 
effects of military spending, trade openness, capital and labour on economic growth in 
case of Portugal. Empirical evidence reported in Table-6 indicates that the relationship 
between defence spending and economic growth is positive and significant at 5 per cent 
level of significance. It implies that a 1 per cent increase in defence spending will 
stimulate economic growth by 0.4948 per cent. These findings are consistent with line of 
literature such as Sezgin, (1997, 1999, 2000), Halicioglu, (2003, 2004) for Turkey, 
Narayan and Singh (2007) for the Fiji Islands, Wijeweera and Webb, (2009) for Sri Lanka, 
Atesoglu (2009) and Gupta et al. (2010) for US economy. Empirical analysis found that 
trade openness is positively and significantly linked with economic growth. A 0.3095 per 
cent economic growth is stimulated by 1 per cent increase in trade openness, all else same. 
Trade openness has a dominant role in raising economic growth in case of Portugal. The 
impact of capital on economic growth is positive and statistically significant at 5 per cent 
level of significance. All else the same, a 1 percent increase in economic growth is linked 
with a 0.1377 per cent increase in capital in Portuguese economy. This implies that capital 
is a stimulus for economic growth. The relationship between labour and economic growth 
                                                 
4 Structural breaks are based on ZA unit root test. 
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is positive and it is significant at 1 per cent level. A 1 per cent increase in labour adds in 
economic growth by 0.1619 per cent, keeping other things constant.  
 
Table-6: Long Run Analysis 
Dependent Variable = tYln  
Variable Coefficient T-statistics Coefficient T-statistics 
Constant  -4.0157*** -2.0415 36.5987*** 1.8533 
tDln  0.4948** 2.4883 -16.2888** -2.0473 
2ln tD  …. …. 1.5589** 2.0776 
tTRln  0.3095* 5.8387 0.2472* 3.3995 
tKln  0.1377** 2.4737 0.1528* 3.1190 
tLln  0.1619* 2.8348 0.2802* 4.0084 
R-Squared 0.9729  0.9752  
F-statistic 225.189*  229.642*  
Diagnostic Tests  
Test  F-statistic Prob. Value F-statistic Prob. Value 
NORM2  0.3692 0.8301 0.4000 0.8201 
SERIAL2  1.8671 0.1352 1.7270 0.1676 
ARCH2  1.4341 0.2821 2.3809 0.1038 
WHITE2  1.5716 0.1960 1.7189 0.1123 
REMSAY2  0.5567 0.3899 0.1071 0.7463 
Note: *, ** and *** denote the significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
NORM2 is for normality test, SERIAL2 for LM serial correlation test, ARCH2 for 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity, WHITE
2 for white heteroskedasticity and 
REMSAY2 for Resay Reset test. 
 
The monotonous impact of defense spending on economic growth is also investigated by 
including squared term of tDln  i.e. 
2ln tD . Our empirical evidence indicates U-shaped 
relationship between defense spending and economic growth. This implies that economic 
growth declines at initial stages of defense spending and after the threshold point 
economic growth is stimulated. The threshold point is 238 defense spending per capita 
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(Euro). Less than 238 defense spending per capita declines economic growth and 
economic growth is stimulated if defense spending is more than 238 defense spending per 
capita. These findings are in line of literature such as Pieroni (2009). 
 
Table-7: Short Run Analysis 
Dependent Variable = tYln  
Variable  Coefficient T-statistics Prob. value 
Constant  0.0094* 3.9346 0.0007 
tDln  0.1966* 3.7296 0.0012 
tTRln  0.0901* 3.2127 0.0040 
tKln  0.1991* 6.9776 0.0000 
tLln  0.7694 1.0434 0.3081 
1tECM  -0.2311** -2.7253 0.0124 
R-Squared 0.9007   
F-statistic 39.929*   
D. W Test 1.6746   
Diagnostic Tests 
Test  F-statistic Prob. value  
NORM2  0.9235 0.6301  
SERIAL2  0.6442 0.5355  
ARCH2  0.2008 0.6578  
WHITE2  1.2016 0.3552  
REMSAY2  0.7705 0.3899  
Note: *, ** and *** denote the significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
To examine the short run impact of independent variables including lagged error term, 
error correction model (ECM) is used. The results of the short run model are reported in 
Table-7. The coefficient of lagged error term i.e. 1tECM  indicates the speed of 
adjustment from short run towards the long run equilibrium path with a negative sign. It is 
suggested by Bannerjee et al. (1998) that significance of the lagged error term further 
validates the established long run relationship between the variables. Our empirical 
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exercise indicates that the coefficient of 1tECM  is -0.2311 and significant at 1 per cent 
level of significance. It implies a 23.11 per cent of disequilibrium from the current year’s 
shock seems to converge back to the long run equilibrium in the next year. The full 
convergence process will take more than 4 years to reach stable long run equilibrium path 
which is an indication of very fast and significant adjustment process for the Portuguese 
economy in any shock to the economic growth equation. 
 
In the short run, the relationship between defence spending and economic growth is 
positive and it is significant. It is documented that a 1 percent increase in military spending 
will increase economic growth by 0.1996 per cent in short span of time. The relationship 
between trade openness and economic growth is positive and significant at 1 per cent 
significance level5. The results indicate that a 1 per cent rise in capital shows moderate 
effect on economic growth i.e. 0.1991 per cent. The impact of labour on economic growth 
is positive but it is insignificant.  
 
For the short run model, diagnostic tests also indicate that there is no evidence of serial 
correlation and error term is normally distributed. The autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity and white heteroskedasticity are not found. Finally, the short run model 
is well specified as confirmed by Ramsey RESET test. The stability of long run and short 
run estimates is checked by applying the cumulative sum (CUSUM) and the cumulative 
sum of squares (CUSUMSQ) tests. The results of the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ reveal that 
both short run and long run estimates are stable and reliable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 The coefficient of long run for trade openness is higher than short run. 
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Figure-1: Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals  
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Figure-2: Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals 
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The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
 
The VECM Granger Causality Analysis  
The presence of cointegrating among the variables leads us to perform the Granger 
causality test to provide a clearer picture for policymakers to formulate defence and 
economic policies by understanding the direction of causality between defence spending 
and economic growth. It is reported that variables are cointegrated for long run 
relationship and this leads us to apply the VECM framework to detect direction of 
causality between the variables both for long-and-short runs. The results of the Granger 
causality test are reported in Table-8. 
 
The causality relation can be divided into short-and-long runs causation as variables are 
cointegrated for long run relationship. The long run causality is indicated by the 
significance of coefficient of the one period lagged error-correction term 1tECT   in 
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equation (9) using t-test. The short run causality can be detected by the joint significance 
of LR test of the lagged explanatory variables in the equation. Our empirical results 
suggest that the 1tECT  is having negative sign and it is statistically significant in all the 
VECM equations except in the growth VECM equation. 
 
In the long run, economic growth Granger causes defence spending. Bidirectional 
causality is found between capital and military spending. There is a feedback hypothesis 
between labour and trade openness. Unidirectional causality is found running from the 
economic growth to capital, labour and trade openness. Trade openness and defence 
spending Granger cause each other. Feedback hypothesis also exist between capital and 
trade openness.  
 
There is a bidirectional causal relationship exists between defence spending and economic 
growth in the short run. Capital and labor Granger cause economic growth while 
unidirectional causality is found running defence spending to capital. Feedback hypothesis 
are noted between capital and labour. Bidirectional causality exists between labour and 
trade openness and same conclusion is drawn for economic growth and trade openness.  
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Table-8: The VECM Granger Causality Analysis 
Dependent  
Variable 
Direction of Causality 
Short Run Long Run Joint Long-and-Short Run Causality 
1ln  tY  1ln  tD  1ln  tK  1ln  tL  1ln  tTR  1tECT  11,ln  tt ECTY  11,ln  tt ECTD  11,ln  tt ECTK  11,ln  tt ECTL  11,ln  tt ECTTR  
tYln  …. 3.7535** 
[0.0477] 
30.9809* 
[0.0000] 
1.9325** 
[0.1792] 
10.8477* 
[0.0012] 
…. …. …. …. …. ….
tDln  4.3973** 
[0.0289] 
…. 0.2453 
[0.7852] 
0.7615 
[0.4822] 
1.8664 
[0.1850] 
-0.3397** 
[-2.1128] 
11.4715* 
[0.0002] 
…. 1.8359 
[0.1789] 
2.1554 
[0.1213] 
2.1839 
[0.1278] 
tKln  0.6474 
[0.5358] 
4.8156** 
[0.0220] 
…. 7.9219* 
[0.0037] 
5.2246** 
[0.0170] 
-0.2525** 
[-2.4106] 
2.1610 
[0.1302] 
5.6550* 
[0.0071] 
…. 5.5568* 
[0.078] 
4.2435* 
[0.0207] 
tLln  1.7166 
[0.2094] 
0.7602 
[0.4828] 
3.7726** 
[0.0441] 
…. 4.2783** 
[0.0313] 
-0.0564* 
[-13.8716] 
100.2115* 
[0.0000] 
64.6148* 
[0.000] 
71.4235* 
[0.0000] 
…. 75.4239* 
[0.0000] 
tTRln  0.6165* 
[0.0075] 
2.2906 
[0.1316] 
0.7227 
[0.4998] 
4.8634** 
[0.0214] 
…. -0.1026* 
[-6.4400] 
14.1329* 
[0.0001] 
4.4703** 
[0.0173] 
14.8899* 
[0.0001] 
15.1083* 
[0.0000] 
….
Note: *, ** and *** show significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels respectively.  
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6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The allocation of military spending for any economy like Portugal is one of the major policy 
issues which can direct the pace of economic growth. Therefore, the issue of military 
spending-growth nexus has been investigated using cross-section and time series data analysis 
across developed, developing and least developed economies by the researchers frequently. 
Various researchers applied supply-side to explore the nature of the relationship between 
defence spending and economic growth and produced mixed results. Using time series data 
set and the ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration, relationship between military 
spending and economic growth in the case of Portugal has been investigated over the period 
of 1980-2009.   
 
Our empirical exercise has confirmed cointegration between economic growth, military 
spending, trade openness, capital and labour. Moreover, results have indicated positive effects 
of military spending on economic growth for Portuguese economy. These findings are 
consistent with the existing literature such as Sezgin, (2001) for Turkey and Greece; 
Halicioglu, (2003, 2004) for Turkey; Yildirm et al. (2005) for OECD countries; Dunne and 
Nikolaidou (2005) for Portugal; Narayan and Singh (2007) for Fiji Island; Wijeweera and 
Webb, (2009) for Sri Lanka; Atesoglu (2009) and Gupta et al. (2010) for US; Wijewerra and 
Webb (2011) for South Asia and Tiwari and Shahbaz (2012) for India. These results are 
contradictory with Cappelen et al. (1984); Heo (1999); Atesoglu, (2002); Birdi and Dunne, 
(2002); Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarm (2003); Karagol and Palaz, (2004); Karagol (2006); Smith 
and Tuttle, (2008); Pieroni, (2009); d’Agostino et al. (2010) etc. Trade openness contributes 
to economic growth. Capital and labour are also important determinants of economic growth 
and add in economic growth significantly. The non-linear relationship between defence 
spending and economic growth is U-shaped in case of Portugal supporting view reported by 
Pieroni (2009).  
 
The causality analysis unveils that unidirectional causality is found running economic growth 
to defence spending. The feedback effect exists between capital and military spending. Trade 
openness and labour Granger cause each other. Economic growth Granger causes capital, 
labour and trade openness. Trade openness Granger causes defence spending and vice versa. 
Bidirectional causality is also found between capital and trade openness. 
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This study has potential for inclusion of other variables to reexamine the relationship between 
defence spending and economic growth in the case of Portugal in the future. Although this is 
another area of research that goes beyond the scope of this paper, we hypothesize that the 
potential variables are savings, investment, corruption, inequality, education and health 
expenditures, external debt, political instability. In addition, undertaking institutional reforms 
and exploring investment opportunities can further boost economic growth in Portuguese. 
Quarterly or monthly data should be used to attain the more consistent results for comparing 
with the current data. This work raises some additional questions such as: 1) What are the 
underlying channels that dictate long-run causality between these variables for top military 
spending economics 2) What is the defence-GDP relationship in other  advanced and  
emerging economies? These issues are, of course, intriguing, and thus left for future research. 
This would help the Portuguese government to formulate comprehensive defence and 
economic policy to sustain economic growth for the long run.    
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